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Book Review: Law, Virtue and Justice
The concept of virtue is central in both contemporary ethics and epistemology, yet in law there has only
recently been an interest in virtue theory among legal scholars. Law, Virtue and Justice is a collection of
essays examining the role of virtue in general jurisprudence as well as in specific areas of the law, with
chapters on philosophical aspects and the relevance of empathy to our understanding of justice and legal
morality. This collection moves current discussions forward and is sure to be a valuable resource for legal
scholars and practitioners for years to come, writes Mark D. White. 
Law, Virtue and Justice. Amalia Amaya and Ho Hock Lai (eds.). Hart
Publishing. December 2012.
Find this book:  
Thanks to the 24-7 news cycle, we are more f amiliar than ever with the
personalit ies involved in legal decision-making, such as judges,
legislators, and lawyers. When academics and commentators debate the
actions of  legal actors, it is of ten in terms of  consequentialist or
deontological ethics, proclaiming that they should make a certain decision
because it ’s the best thing or the right thing to do. Ironically, given how
closely we may f eel we “know” these people, we rarely f ocus on the moral
character of  the legal actors as a f actor in the decisions they make.
The seventeen chapters in Law, Virtue and Justice, edited by Amalia
Amaya and Ho Hock Lai, do just that. Drawing f rom the “standard”
Aristotelian account of  virtue, as well as the views of  Plato, Hume,
Nietzsche, and Conf ucius, the contributors to Law, Virtue and Justice
present a wide range of  virtue-oriented perspectives on a variety of  legal
issues, especially jurisprudence and criminal law. The editors’ introduction provides a
compact but ref erence-heavy summary of  previous work on virtue and the law bef ore
summarizing the chapters in the book, which are organized in f ive sections. While all of  the
chapters contain much to commend them, I will f ocus on only two; as it happens, both are
written by editors of  the volume.
Of  the several chapters in the book about judicial decision-making, Amalia Amaya’s chapter ‘The Role of
Virtue in Legal Justif ication’ serves as the best entry point, building on Lawrence Solum’s seminal work in
the area. (Solum also adds to his previous work in a chapter co-authored with Linghao Wang on Conf ucian
jurisprudence.) Amaya goes beyond the claim that legal decision-makers should possess virtues like
honesty and prudence in service of  a consequentialist or deontological conception of  law, as well as the
claim that virtuousness of  legal actors may support—but not constitute—the value of  their decisions. She
argues instead an essential role f or virtue in which it serves as the basis on which legal decisions are
assessed: a legal decision is right because it  was made by a virtuous legal agent.
Amaya spends the balance of  her concise chapter weighing strong and weak versions of  her arguments, as
well as conf ronting objections based on the priority of  reasons (which she calls the publicity objection), the
authority of  the law, and disagreement about virtue themselves. These three distinct objections share a
common element in that they all call into question the f ocus on the agent which is the hallmark of  virtue
ethics. They claim that too much emphasis is put on legal decision-makers rather than on the reasons on
which they make decisions, the extent to which these reasons rely on legal materials, and the particular
virtues that serve to justif y their decisions. In response, Amaya def tly explains that the objections
oversimplif y the role of  virtue in legal justif ication: f or instance, virtue does not obscure the role of
reasons based on the law, but rather governs how the legal agent develops and incorporates them. The
chapter f inishes with an abbreviated discussion on Aristotelian practical reasoning, which can be
supplemented with the previous chapter by Claudio Michelson.
Amaya’s co-editor, Ho Hock Lai, contributes another standout chapter, ‘Virtuous Deliberation on the
Criminal Verdict’. In this chapter, Lai considers the intellectual or epistemic virtues behind the well-known
command given to juries to determine guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.” However much this standard may
be f leshed out, it can never made precise, leaving space that must be f illed by judgment, “an inescapable
dimension of  verdict deliberation” (p. 243). This judgment is to be exercised with excellence as represented
by virtues such as logical thinking, sensit ivity to detail, and imagination (which aids in thinking of  alternative
explanations). Lai recognizes that virtuous deliberation may not lead to a f actually correct verdict, just as
correct verdicts may be the result of  f aulty deliberation, and so he examines the intrinsic virtues of
deliberation separately f rom their instrumental value of  f inding the truth.
Conf ronted with a plethora of  relevant virtues, Lai f ocuses on three, two of  which are discussed in other
chapters as well (contributing to the cohesiveness of  the volume, a tribute to Ho and Amaya’s work as
editors). An obvious epistemic virtue is practical wisdom, an essential element of  all virtuous action and
appropriately emphasized throughout the book (including Amaya’s and Michelson’s chapters, as mentioned
previously). Another is empathy, which Lai f rames as enhancing the concept of  “justice as humanity,” and is
revisited in the f inal section of  the book by Michael Slote and others. Finally, Lai considers the vice of
prejudice and the corresponding virtues: integrity, open-mindedness, and humility. This discussion is
particularly t imely given emerging knowledge as unconscious biases and the value of  resisting them in f ull
recognition of  the dif f iculty of  doing so.
If  I have one small reservation about the book, it ’s that several chapters, while valuable on their own merits,
have a weaker link to law and justice than most. For example, Slote’s chapter on empathy summarizes his
innovative work on care ethics but is light on legal implications; his commenters, John Deigh and Susan J.
Brison, touch on the law slightly more as they crit ique Slote’s moral theory. Nonetheless, the f ocus of
these three chapters (and Slote’s brief  reply) seems to be on Slote’s conception of  the ethics of  care more
than its connection to law—certainly an important discussion in its own right, but may disappoint readers
who expected a steady f ocus on law through the lens of  virtue ethics.
The virtue-oriented approach to law, in my opinion, of f ers the most direct and constructive response to
legal f ormalism, the persistent belief  that legal decision-making is simply a matter of  mechanical
deliberation based on legal evidence. It highlights the ubiquitous need f or judgment while at the same time
asserting standards of  excellence f or its practice (necessary to counter inevitable objections of  “anything
goes”). Amaya and Lai’s Law, Virtue and Justice moves this discussion f orward in several dif f erent ways,
and it is sure to be a valuable resource f or legal scholars and practit ioners f or years to come.
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